'<A SKETCH OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH. CAJtPAIQNS," ETC. 693 first year's campaign at about a hundred thousand men and three liundred guns.
On the 23th of April, war as formally declared by Russia, and on the 7th of h h f , two corps, the 6th and 'ith, crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principnlities.
This declaration of war, SO closely followed by the invasion of her territory, did not of course take Turkey by surprise, but it found her but ill-prepared for defence. The destruction of herfleet a t Navarino in the preceding autumn liad given to Russia the undisputed command of the Black Sea, without which, as Tve shall clearly see, the passage of the Balkan would liave been impossible. Her regular Army-or Nizam-n-as so recent a creation that it had not yet acquired the ~011-sistency of disciplined troops. It was also composed mainly of mere lads, it l i a~n g been thought that it would be easier a t that early age to break them in to a system so novel, and so violently opposed to ail their national and religious prejudices; and in the third place, the necessity of opposing a large force to the Russian troops collected on her Asiatic frontier prevented her from drcwing reinforcements from the northern provinces of Asia Xinor, which had always furnished the hardiest and most faithful portion of her Army:
Before entering upon n sketch of tlie military operations, it may be well to make a few general observations on the theatre of war in European Turkey. They shall be very short, for with an' audience composed mostly of military men, I feel as if they were scarcely needed.
The defences of the northern frontier of Turkey arc strong-and clearly defined. Thcy consist of two almost pnrallel lines-about sisty miles apart-the course of the Lower Danubc and the range of -the Balkan.
I n modcrii warfare a river is no longer the formidable barrier that it used to be. But the Danube presents more than ordinay obstacles to the passage of an army advancing from the north. Throughout its whole coursc from Widdin to the sea-and w-e do not need to extend our obserrations bejond Widdin-the right bank dominates the left.
It rises, for the most part, abruptly from the ri-ater's edge, to a Iieight in many places of two or tlirec hundred feet, while on the opposite bank, the country is lorn and marshy, intersected with watercourses and flooded during the rainy season. The.river varies in breadth from half a mile to a mile. In some parts it is sixty or serenty feet deep, but generally mncli less j the ordinary current runs between t J w and three miles an hour. The line of the Danube is strengthened by numerous fortresscs. The chief of these-all of mhich played an important part in the war -are Widdin, Rustcliuk, Silistria, and Brailom. With the exception of the lost-named ther all stand on the right bank. Widdin and Rustcliuk hare tEtes-de-pont on the left b3nk at Kalafat and Giurgovo, idiicli gnvc them frec access into Wallachia and obliged the Russidus to detach a considerable force to keep their maranding parties in check.
Belom Rustchuk there are only two points at n-liicli tlie left bank of the ri-ier can a t all seasons be approached. The first is Oltcnitza and This number includes four thousand Cossacks.
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" A SKETCH OF THE RUSSO-TUlCRISII CAXI'AIQSS the second is opposite to Silistria. TIE rassage a t Oltenitza is defended by an entrenched position at Turtukai on the right bank, x-liicli, though of no great strength, sufficed to deter the Russians lfrom attempting to cross, and caused them, as wc sliall scc, the most serious inconrcnicnce.
For sercral reasons Oltcnitza mould be the most favourable spot for an invading army to pass the Danube. It is tlie mast direct, or a t least the most practicable, line from the Russian frontier to both Shunila and Varua. It avoids the harassing march through the barren and waterless Dobrudscha, and it stands a t a considerable ilis.
tancc from any of the great fortresses, which might tlireaten the line of communication, being twenty-four miles from Silistria, and more than forty from Rustcliuli. Tlie breadth of the river a t this point is just short of n thousand paces.
Of Iirailom me shall Iiare to speak presently. The country lying between the Danube and the Balkan is an undulating plain more or less me11 cultivated, and practicable for troops till sou reach the wooded spurs projecting from tlic grcat mountain mngc. I n the rainy season, however, the Bulgarian roads are wellnigh impassable, while in summer the heat is intense, and tlie water scnnty and bad. Near the soutliern edgc of the great plain stands the fortress, or rather the entrenched camp, of Shumla, mhieh Turlief has always considered her main bulwark n6ainst'Russian invasion. We sliall, ho~vcrcr, find that the possession of Shumls, whicli she retained during the whole war, .was no security against the passage of the Balkan, or even tlic advance upon Adrianoplc. ShumIa is connected with Varna by the' fatified post of. Prm-ndi.
The Balkan consists of n cliain-or n t h e r mass-of thickly rrooded mountains from four to five thousand feet in height and from fifteen to twenty miles in breadth. It is only mith the eastern' part of this c h i n that we shall have to do. The passes are of no very p e a t height, but the country is so ruggccl, and the roads-or rather tracks-so bad that thex would have been xery dificult for troops to cross ergn uii-.opposed. There are six passes considered more or less practicable, but as, oivingito the incapacity and inertness of the Grand Vizier, no attempt was made to defend them, it would only be a wastc of time to describe them, more especially as they llave since that time, I undcrbtand, been strongly fortified.
I will now endeavour to give as clear and concise account as I can #of the inorements of the contending armies, beginning with the Russians, who were ready to take the field long before the Turks liad begun io bestir themselres.
We liavc seen that the 6th and 7th corps had crossed the Pruth 011 the 7th of May. The former, undcr General Roth, was to occupy 3101-dm-is and Wallachia, which it did without opposition. The troops that had been stationed in these provinces had been withdmwn to garrison the Danube fortresses, and all the resources of the Principalities in grain, and cattle, and forage, had bceu abandoned to tliu enemy. Brailom, and commenced siege operations on the alst Bray. ~l~~ besieging force amounted to about 18,000 men. Tire shall find that this was the only siege throughout the war which ~r a s undcrtakell with anything like adequate means. Thougli it must lLzvc been foreseen from.the number of fortresses, aud from the me11 l;no\rn tenacity of Turkish troops behind stone n-alls, that sercral sieges lvould 11ax-c to be carried on at thc same time, only one battering train had been provided ; and to this unnccountable neglect we shall find that most of the hardships, and dangers, and losses of the campaign are to be attributcd.
Brailow is the strongest of all the fortresses on the Lower Danube. AS a rule, the Turkish fortresses are of a very defecticc construction ; they are seldom protected by efficient outworks, and the suburbs are allowed to extend up to the very malls, thus affording shelter to besicging army.
Brailom was rather more scientifically'constrnctcd than most,. It was amply prorided Kith stores of all kinds, and defended by a numerous and determined garrison. The walls were armed with 278 guns and mortars.
Aloltke gives a curious picture of the Illanher in which the guns of Brailow-like those of nll Turkish fortresses, I suppose-were mounted and serred. Guns and mortars of all calibres were placed side by side indiscriminately, and served from a common licap of shot aud shells of cvery size and shape-for he tells us that very fern shells were round. When the balls mere too small, the Turkish gunners wrapped them in a sheepskin to make them fit. The powder was fitored partly i n private houses and partly in wooden sheds. There vierc no cartridges, and all the pieces had to be loaded with a scoop. Yet in spite of all this, the guns were ell served, and did great csecution a t short ranges, which a Turk prefers.
After a stubborn defence of twenty-seven days of open trenches, during which sereral ineffectual attempts were made to carry the place by storm, Brailow capitulated on the 18th June. The garrison iyas allowed to march out with bag and baggage, and to proceed to Silistrin, where they formed the nucleus of the garrison xhich defied all the attempts of the Russians throughout the n-hole of the campaign of 1878 and great part of that of 1829.
lIean\rhile, the 3rd copps, after R month's delay, had cffected the passage of the Danube on the 8th June. It was a daring and hazardous undertaking, and oIred its succcss partly to an unexpected piece of good fortune, and pnrtly to the misconduct of the Turkish troops opposed to them. The spot selected for the passage was Satnnqvo, iie:irly opposito to the Turkish fortress of Isaktclii. Tlic lcft bank of the rwer is liere so low and marshy that the point at whicli the bridge was to be thrown across could only be reached b~ laying down a causc\ray of fascines and planks s e r e n l miles long, rrhile the landing place opposite Iras even more di5cult, being boggy anii overgrown with brnshwood.
The Turks had entrenched themselves on the heights facing Satu11oy0, their left protected by the fortress of Isaktchi. A battery of Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 11:11 30 December 2014 " A SKETCH OF TIIE RUSSO-TURKISH CIMPAIGXS fifteen heavy guns commanded both the proposed site of the bridge, and the museway. Two divisions of infantry mere told off to force the passage. The Emperor Nicholas as present to witness the attack. But fortunately for the Russians, before the bridge had even begun to be constructed, the Turkish position was carried by a coup de ntniiz. A battalion of chasseurs had been brought up as R reinforcement by the flotilla. A tribe of Zaporogne Cossacks who had migrated from Russia into Turkey in the reign of the Empress Catherine, and Jiad done good-service to the P o r k in former mars against Russia, now suddenly returned to their former allegiance ; they liad settled on the banks of the Danube, where they plied the trade of fishermen; they now did excellent service to Russia, for under coyer of the flotilla, they carried over the Chasseurs in their light fishing boats, unpcrceired by thc enemy, and landed them a little below the Turkish cntrenchmcnts. With great boldness, this small body stormed the nearest redoubt, and the Turks-numbering more than 10,000, mostly cavalry-were seized with rt panic, and fled precipitately, part to Isaktchi and part to Bazardjik.
The 3rd corps now crossed into thc Dobrudscha, and Isaktchi surrondcred a t the first summons. The main body, which the Emperor accompanied, commenced its march to the south on the 11th June. It did not exceed 16,000 of all arms, for it had detached four columns of from two to three thousand strong, with R few field pieces, to summon the smaller forts of Isnlitchi, Natchin, Hirsora, and Kustendjc, wliicli threatened both its flanks. This was done in the hope that these places xronld offer no resistanccrt hope, which the result fully justified, for by the time the Russians appeared before them Brailow liad fallen, and one after anotlier they surrendered without firing a shot. Wc have seen that thc 3rd corps did not cross the frontier till R month after the 6th and 7th corps. Yet in spite of this delay, and of tlie sloivness of its subsequent march (it took fourteen days to reach the line of Trajan's Wall, a distance of only serenty-five miles) it WIS still too soon, if its further operations were to be conducted in combination with the other corps. Silistria, far from being taken, as had been calculated upon, XIS not jet even invested. The Gtli corps, to which the siege operations LTd been assigned, had failed to cross tlie Dauube at Oltenitza. The 7th corps was still detained at Drailow, for though the place had capitulated on the 18th of June, ten dnys had been agreed upon for its evacuation. The 3rd corps ~r a s thcreforc unsupported, and TFith Shnmla and Silistrin on its flank and mar, an adsauce upon Varna would hare been most liazardous.
JIoltke is of opinion that, if the 3rd corps had mored boldly upon Silistria, before the garrison had been reinforced by the brave defenders of Brailon-, the place might hare been taken by a cozy de WZ&, for the works Fere both faulty in construction, and much out of repair. Had they succeeded in their attempt, they might then hnw taken the works of Turtdiai in reverse, and opened the passnge of the Danube to thc 6th corps.
AS it n-as, the 3rd corps remained inactive at Kamsu On the 11th July tho 7th corps from Bmilw-joined the main &my a t Bazardjik. Towards the end of the month it was further reinforced by the troops d i i c h had been observing Silistria, and rvliicll =ere relieved by 10,000 meu of the 6th corps from WnlIachin. This force liad been obliged to make n long detour in ordcr to cross the Daniibo a t Ifirsora, having, as we hare seen, been unable to force a passage a t Oltenitza. The insufticiency of the forces detniled for the war was becoming every day more apparent. The main Army collected a t Bazardjik did not exceed 25,000 men, of whom only 2,500 were caralry ; tlie investment of Silistria was incomplete. The two dirisions of the Gth corps left in Wallachia barely sufficed to keep in check tlic garrisons of Widdin and Rustchuk, while the force detached against Varna,.which consisted of only 5,000 men, ~n s utterly inadequate to invest a fortress with a gnrrison of double its numbers.
Xorc especially was the \rant of light caralry felt tliroughont the war. Most of the caralry tliat the Ilussians had bronglit---with the exception of a few regiments of Cossacks-was hcm-y cavalry. Even that which was called light was not really so, for Xoltke states that the Russian Hussar was more hearily equipped than the Prussiaxi Cuirassier. With their large hcavy liorses they were quite unequal to cope with the actire and well mountkd irregular Turkish ilorse erexi at the beginning of the campaign ; much more so, as we shall see, when scarcity of forage, and orcrrork had begun to tell upon them.
Tlic small number of Cossacks employed in this war is said to liave been caused by the fear of lack of forage, but it mas in fact the want of light cavalry that made them unable to collect forage. The Turkish cavalry a l r n j s move in l a g c bodies, which made it hazardous to send out patrols or weak advanccd guards. The saying that where you see one turban yon may be sure there are a thoussncl more, is a \-cry true saying. It was here decided to cliange the line of operations; and the column quitting the dircct road to Varna advanced in the direction of Sllumla.
It mill now be nccessary to 'look back, and sce what measures the Turks had adopted to meet the enemy's advance. It is evident that tlie Porte had contemplated the possibility-if not the prohbility-of a Russian army landing near Constantinople. Their undisputed conlmand of the Black Sea, where they had a fleet of 16 line-of-battle ships, 6 irigates, and 7 corwttes, made such an undertaking quite fcasiblc. Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 11:11 30 December 2014 " A SIiETCri OF THE ICUSSO-TURKISH ctwrdmh's Beeidea this, the Sultan's reforms were very unpopular with the greatpi* part of the Mahomedau population, and an outbreak in the capital a t any time to be dreaded. Thc bulk of the Army mns therefore detained in and around Constantinople, until the advance of the Russians made it absolutely necessary to send forward an army to chcck their progress.
JVe hare already seen that the Principalities xverc entirely denuded of troops, while tlie nuuierous fortresses on the Danube and in the Dobrudsclia mere but inadequately garrisoned. It must, however, be borne i n mind that the inhabitants of a Turkish fortress instead of beiiig a source of reakuess are really a source of strength, every Turk being in possession of arms and well practiscd in the use of them.
When the Russians crossed tlie Pruth the passes of the Balkan mere still unoccupied. It was not until the 31st May, when Brailow had already been besieged for fourteen days, that the Seraskier-or Commander-in-Chief-left Constnntinople for Schumla. On the 3rd of July the Capudan Pacha o r High Admiral-whose occupation afloat was gone-marched with a large force to Varna. Lastly t t c Grand Vizier only qtiitted the capital at the beginning of August, for Adria.
nople. But for the unaccountable deficiencies and consequent delays of the Russians both the Turkish lines of defence might hare been broken before any effectid measures had been taken to hold them. But by the time the Russian Army had directed its march upon Shumla, tliis neglect had been in a great measure remedied. The Seraskier had succeeded in assembling a t that point : L force of about 32,000 infantrj-including 10,000 Arnaouts or Albanians, undisciplined but fierce and dauntless soldiers-and 13,000 cavalry. Whatet-er may ham bcqu liis military capacity-or incapacity-the Ser;lskier was a man of great. energy, and he set to work at once to improve and to extend the fortifications of the place.
For more than a centurr Shumla, as I hare already remarked, lias been looked upon by the 'i'urks as the main bulwark of the Empire, aud in all their Tars mith Russia it has been occupied as a n entrcnclied camp. I n 1774, and again in 1810, it successfully resisted the attacks of the Russians, and wc shall see that throughout the mliole of the campaigns of 1828 and 1829 i t again defied all their attempts to n d i e themselves masters of it. Whether its defence on this occasion was not too dearly purchased by the neglect of still more important points is anothdr question.
The position of ShuGla is a very striking one as you approach it from tlie north or from the east. It stands ou a plateau some e k h t or nine huuclrcd feet above the great plain of Bulgaria forming a spur from the Balkan, but scpnrated from the main range by the valley of the Kaiiistchik. The t o r n itself is not fortified. It is, however, effectunlly protected on three sides by a chain of x-ootlecl hills which form as it ivere nu ampliitheatre rouud it, while the fourth is dcfendcd by a continuous line of works carried along tlic outer ridge of tlic plateau and abutting at either end on prccipitous heights. This line coiisiits of earthworks with a deep but iiarroiv ditch, and its lengtli is about S,OOO pices. 
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trenched. camp occupied by the barracks of the infantry. cavalry irere picketed in a sheltered and well watered rallcy a little in rear of the camp. 500 yards in advancc of the fortiEed front a chain of redoubts was csteuded across the plain. Several roads converging upon Shumla afforded means of obtaining supplies from districts not occupied by the enemy.
An assault upon a place so strong, and held by SO large a garrison, mas of course not to bc thought of, nor indeed would the possession of Shumla hare been an unmixed advantoye to an invading army. It would, it is true, have made its flank more scoure, but it would not have opened the passes of the Balkan, from which it is too far distant. On the other hand the large force which was shut up in the entrenched camp would have been set free to occupy those passes and bar the further progress of the Army.
A complete investment of the place was cqually out of thc question, not only on account of tho extent of country that would have to be guarded, but because of the danger to the investing force from the frcqucnt and vigorous sorties of a garrison so strong in cavalry. Had Varna by this time been hardly pressed, as it might wcll have been, the Russian Army might have takon up a strong position at some distance from the place in the hope of drawing the Senskier out of his entrcnchments for the relief of that fortress, but tlie siege of Varna was still unaccountably delayed for mint both of guns and of men.
Under these circumstances it mas decided to make a t least a partial investment of the place, and the Russians proceeded to throw up a chaiti of redoubts ID front of the Turkish lines. They had, however, the great disadvantage of bcitq mitliiu range of the enemy's heavy guns, to whose fire their own field-pieces were unablc effectually to reply. A t the snmc time they had the mortification of seeing long strings of camels laden with provisions aud ammnnition entcring the camp daily from the hills behind tlic town. This led to an attempt to close the approaches from that side, but it was found too hazardous on accourit of the vigorous sorties made by the garrison, and it was soou abandoned.
Things continued thus for many weeks, the sorties of the Turks becoming every day more daring. Colonel Chesney relates that the most daring of these sorties were led by Hemin Pasha, whom he states t o have been tlic JIameluke who alone escapcd from the massacre of his comrades a t Cairo in 1811, by leaping his horse over the ramparts of the citadel. His ambition was to capture the Emperor, who was prescnt with the Army at that time, and to csact as his ransom the rcstitution of the Crirnea to Turkey.
On the 27th August, the Seraskier niade a night attack-a phenomcnon, 3foltkc remarks, in Turkish military history-on tn.0 of tho principal Russian forts. One of them i~a s successfully stormccl, and the guns carried off in triumph. On the 10th September he niade a still more rigorous attack before chylight with a force of 8,000 men, but fortunately the ItuFsians had been warned by their Buls3rian spies, and were prepared to meet it.
At length tlic Russiau General perceivcd the uselessness of perseverDownloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 11:11 30 December 2014 i 0 0 ing in the investment. The army had lain for more than six weeks before Shumln, exposed to the fearful lieat of a Bulgmian summer; Insufficient food, and bad water, liad filled tho Geld-hospitals to overflowing, and there was no place of security to xhich their sick could be removed. Scarcity of forage and over-i~ork xere carrying off their horses at the rate ot' more tlian n. hundred a-day, and their reduced and enfeebled camlry vins no longer able t o protect their convoys from the flying columns of Spahis which hung about their communications.
IIoltlie points out that during theze months-August and Sep. tember-the position of the Russians was cveryn*here critical. The blockade of Silistria as altogether ineffectual ; the siege of Varna had only just begun-and not uudcr promising auspices, while Wdlachia i n s serioas1.r threatened by klic enterprising garrisons of Widdin and Rustchuk. Had the Turkisli commanders shown half as much capacity as they did onergy, the result of the campaign could not but have prored disastrous to the Russians.
Tlic siege of Yarna had been formally opened by the Emperor on 3rd of August. The Russian fleet, under Admiral Greig, had arrived n few days before bringing reinforcements, and had anchored a mile and a half from the toim prepared to take part i n tho siege. The besieging armr, under Prince Nenschikoff, did not a t this time exceed 9,000 men, but early in September it was reinforced by the 2nd corps and a division of the Guards, which miscd its numbers to 18,000 or 20,000, and enabled Nenscliikoff to complete the blockade. But still there T T~S no battering train, though Bmilom had fallen on the 18th of June. " The fate of this battering train," says Noltke, " is iurolved " in mystery. After thc fall of Brailow it was abbscnt cvcrydiere."
They n-ere obliged to mnkc shift a t last with ship p n s .
. On the other hand, tho Capudan Pasha, whose departure from Constantinoplc we h a w already mentioned, liad arrived a t TTarnn on the 17th July with 5,000 men, mostly nrtilleg, and had entered the plwe u l d e r tlic Tery eyes of the Russians. The garrison now numbered 15,000 men, of whom nearly half were Albanians. The walls m-erc armed with 162 guns.
I must refer my hearers for all details of this memorable siege to the two cliapteis that Moltke has deroted to this subject. It weald be impossible to abridge them without their losing all their ioterest. It was of vital importauce to the Russians to make themselves masters of the place vdliout delaj-, for their situation was becoming critical ; their daily losses ~w r e Iieaq-; disease as rife in their camp-it said even the plague. The position of the main Army before Shumh was precarious ; and a large army, under the command of the Gnnd Vizier himself, as advancing t o the relie€ of the place. The siege operations r e r e therefore presscd with all the rigonr possible. Kothing could exceed tho energy and perseverance of t h e assailants, unless it were the determined conrage of the defenders. The latter, long after the siege had commenced, maintained their positions outside the walls, and surrounded themselves with a labyrinth of lodgments which sometimes interfered with the Russian approaches. The siege was carried on more by means of mines and galleries than by batteries, and though sereral practicable breaches were made by the esplosion of the mines, and crcn n lodgment effected on one of bastions, the nrdour of the defence newr slackened. Colonel C1iesne-jrelates that the Capudan Paclis worked with his o m liands to close the breach, and adds, that " he encouraged his men with a stick '' The fierce obstinacywith which the Arnaouts defended the ditch to the last, neither gix-ing nor rccciring quarter, is almost incredible. &ltke9s remark is indecd true,-that defence only begins with n Turk --here it ends xitli any other troops.
Jfnnmliile the Grand Vizier's zeal had cooled, and halting his army on the Kamstchik, he sent Omar Pacha with 15,000 men to attempt tlic.relief of Varna. Omar adranced within a few miles of tile fortrcss, and then, in Turkish fashion, he entrenched himself strongly a t the village of Rurtcpe.
Prince Eugene of Wurtemburg vas sent to dislodge him, and was making arrangements to do so when he rcccired peremptory orders from the Empcror to attack the position in front. The Emperor had been led to beliem that the Turkish force was much weaker than it was, nor was he acquainted with the rugged and w-ooded nature of the ground which made their position almost unassailable. So thick was the mood that the Russian guns could not be brought into action, and the battle was a succession of hand-to-hand encounters. The i-csult was undecided, but the gallantry of the Russian troops had great effect upon the Turks ; and though Prince Eugene had to fall back, and the road to Varnn was open to him, Omar Pasha did not arail liimsclf of the opportunity. He remained inactive in his entrenchments, though the explosion of mine after mine must hovc.warned him that the fall of Varne was imminent. And when, after a few days; he saw the Russian flag floating over the ruins of the fortress, he made n precipitate retreat beyond the Kamstchik. For fourteen days this rcliei-ing force had been withiu five milcs of Varna -iiithout rendering any assistance to the hard-pressed garrison.
It scems strange that the Commander mlio had conducted so heroic D defence should turn traitor a t the last. There is, however, no doubt that the intclligence of some intrigue that was being carried on against him a t Constantiuople led Pussuf Pacha to betray his trust. Acconipanieil by a large bod-j-of followers he sought the Russian camp, and threw himself on the m e r q of the Czar. The gallant Capuclan Paslin refused to surrender, and retired into the citadel with several hundred men. The siege had lasted eighty-nine days, twenty-seven of which Jyith practicable breaches. Two-thirds of the garrison had fallen, and Varnn was a heap of ruins.
Tliere may perhaps be some few here prescnt besides myself who remember the dcep interest with whicli the progress of tLc siege of Varna was watched in England. A war between Turkey and Russia was not, homercr, supposed a t that time to be fraught with such serious consequences to the balance of powcr in Europe as it llns bee11 of late years, nor ~w r e our sympathies with the dcfenders height- It corn. menccd on thc 2lst of July, a t t h snme timc that the main 8 1 1~1~ arrircd before Shnmla, and the inrc;tmcnt of Vama bepn.
Silistrin has played an important part in erery mar bctwccn Turkey ancl Russia. It commands onc of tho most practicable passages of tlic Danube, and threatens the flank of an army advancing upon either Shumla or Tarn,. It was taken by thc Rnssians in 1810, and razed to the ground; bnt it ivas soon rcbrrilt. I n 18.38-and indced SO latc as 1854-the fortificntions of Silistria i-ierc rery imperfect. It had no r c p l a r outx-iorks-only a fcK lodgmcnts, as Uoltkc calls thcm, in front of thc gates, which xronld otherwise opcn on thc plain. It is surronnded by a IOIV rampart and a dry ditch, which one of the English defcndcrs of the place contcmptuously describcd to inc as being d i n t D good hunter T o d d takc in his stride.
Thc place is commandcd from the adjacent heights, and isalso within range of tlic opposite bank of the Dnnubc, vhich at this point is only a thousand paccs in 1)readth. The garrison had bccn rcinforccd by a part of thosc of Brailom and the small forts of tlic Dobrudseha, and the tomn contained about 6,000 inhabitants capable of bearing arms. A Russian flotilla of thirty-six ressels rcachcd Silistria on the 10th August, but it i-ias of littlc use. It did not ercn capture or destroy a rcry iufcrior Turkish flotilla mhich was aiding in the defence, nor was any attempt made to throir a bridgc across thc river, which xould have facilitatcd thc arriral of supplies and secured a safc line of rctrcat. I n the middle of October the besieging forcc was raiscd to 30,000 by the arrival of the 3rd corps.
Finding that the placc could not-or rather, mould not-be taken, it as dccirlcd to convert the sicgc into a blockade, but tho wcathcr had no7r broken up. Incessant rain flooded thc trenches, follomcd by snow and picrcing cold. Sickness increased to an alarming extent, and on thc 10th Norcmber, after an ineffectual attempt to terrify the girrison into surrender by a bombardment of forty-eight hours, the sicge as raiscd. Tho retreat, though unopposed, \vas disastrous ; the roads were so deep that it required 200 men to dmg a single gun ; after undergoing scvcre hardships tlic besieging Army a t length succeeded in recrossing the Danube at Hirsora. The season was now too far admnced for furthcr operations, and it v a s dccidecl to place the army in minter qnartcrs. The Gth and 7th corps wcrc cantoned in and around Vnrna and P n r a d i ; thc rest of the army in Wallachin and Noldn~ia, csccpting the Guards who were morcd back into Bessarabia. The linc occupied by the Russians extended from Varna to Cnjora, a distance of 250 miles, and it was cut in t r o by thc Danubc. Only in prcscncc of snch an cncms as the Turks could such winter-quarters have been taken up irith impunity. But the Tnrkisli Irregulars, who were thc most likely to harass thcm, had disbanded themselves on the approach of winter and returned to I hare only time to notice briefly the siege of Silistria. iO3 their homes in Asia. " They had," they said, " left their lrintcr-stock-6 ' ings behind."
In slimming up the rcsnlts of the campnip, n-c find that after the fall of Bmilom, and the small forts of the Dobrudscha, tile onis real ~uccess bad been the capture of Varna--ho~\-IlnrdIy TI-on I r e hnrc already seen. Sliumla and Silistria had cIefied a11 tIlc cfforts made to tnkc them, and in tho numerous engagements that Lad tzkeu place in the open field, the results llad been quite ns often favourable to the Turks as to the Russians.
As Xoltlic ~C I I I : W~~S , " Wlicn TC consider the enormous sacrifices tllat 6-the Tar cost the Russians in 1&2SS: it is dificult to say u.hether they or the Turks won or lost it. It remained for n second c a m p i p to 6' decide the d u e of tlie first."
We must now cast a glnncc at n-hat liad been going on during this time on the Asiatic frontier of Tnrke-y ; but it will not bc nccc.ssarJ to enter iuto mucli detail, as the military operations in that quarter Ilad only been i q o r t a n t in SO far as tlicy had obliged the Turks to di>-ide their forces.
Until the year 1EOl tlic Caucasus had formed tlic soutlicrn boundary of Russia, md the Turkish frontier had been a vci-y dcfensilile onc.
Her actual frontier was far less wdl defined
The war between Russia and Persia, which hnd begun in 1826, Imd just bccn bronglit to a successful close by a winter campnign, and General Paskevitcli's army \\-as now disposable for operations ngainst Tuakcr. It consisted of about 30,000 men with 130 guns.
To this force the Turks were at first able to oppose only a smail nnd disorgauiscd army.
The ea:nptligii opei~xl with the siege and capture of Anapn by n naval force, assisted bj-n detachment from tlie Army of the Caucasus. h t before Annpn, had fallen, the Russian army had begun its adrancc from Tiflis. It moved in tlircc columns, the right torards the Black Sea, the left towards Aimcnia, and the main body towards Rnrs. On the 14th June, abont 15,000 men crossed the Araxes near Goomri, an important Russian frontier-post, now strongly fortified, and continued its inarch unopposed to ICnrs, where it took up a position south of that fort, between it and the Army of the Seraskier. It is unnecessaq to describe n place so me11 known as Kars has since become. It had alwap bccn one of the bulwarks of Asiatic Turkey, and had successfully resisted Kadir Shnli in 1735 and a foitmer invasion of the Rnssiaus in 1807.
On the present occasion it did not uphold its former (or its future)
fame. The weak ~d l s of the suburbs were soon breaclied, and tlic suburbs theuiselvcs occupied after n short but sharp resistance. The fall of the t o m followed within a fcw days, and 011 the 23rd of June the Pasha surrcncterecl thc citadel. TIE relieving army mas actually mithin sight lrlien the place fell. l S 0 guns and large storcs of nmniunition fell into the hands of the llussians.
The plague now broke out in the Runsian camp j this delayed fur. Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 11:11 30 December 2014 '' A SKETCII OF THE RUSSO-TUREISIF CAMPAIGXS ther operations and gave the Seraskier time to collect some 35,000 men, with whom he took up n position in front of Ardegan. This niorcmcnt prevented Paskcvitch from adrancing upon Erzeroum, as he would have left this army in his rear, SO he made dcmoiistratioll against rlrdcgan, which caused the Pasha to bent a Iiasty rctrcat across the Saganlugh mountains. Hc then doubled back and appeared unex. pcctcdly before the strong fort of Abhalkalaki, which was takeu by storm after a short bombardment. The garrisoii resolutely refused to surrender, and two-thirds of their number pcrislied in the assault.
I may bere mention that the inhabitants of this bleak mountainous part of Asia JIinor arc among the hardiest and bravest of the subjects of the Porte, and, I may add, the most fanatical.
Paskevitch next moved against, Akhaltsik, s still stronger place. Short as is the tlistance, it took him ten days to reach it, so difficult was it t o carry troops and guns through that densely wooded and monntainous country. He arrived just in time to take up a strong position' com.
manding the \rest front of the fortress, and to throw up some entrench. ments, before the Seraskier appeared with a large force to relieve the place. The Pasha imprudently di\-ided his force, and after an obstinate resistance the Russians succeeded in carrying his mhole position. The Seraskier, after losing 10 guns and 1,700 men, threm himself into the fortress mith several thousand men.
The defencc of Akhaltsik was as heroic ns that of Bmilow. After a lodgment had been made in one of the bastions, the Russians advanced to the assault. For thirteen hours the garrison maintained a desperate resistance; the Russians fought with equal obstinacy. At length they carried a howitzer by hand across the ditch and placed it on the flat roof of a church. A shell set fire to the toxm, which continued to burn throughout the night, lighting up the fierce cpn6ict. At daybreak the fort surrendered, being no longer tenable.
After the fall of Akhaltsik nothing of any consequcncc was under. taken by thc main army, but the left wing had made itself master of the important town and fortress of Bayazid. This secured to the Russians the possession of the whole country as far as thc Saganlugh range, which furnished them with a good base for the operations of the next year's campaign.
The rest of his army dispersed.
\
We must now return to the more important theatre of ivar in Europe, and relate thp events of the decisive campaign of 1829.
The command of the Russian Army had been transferrcd to General Diebitsch, n-ho had served in the preceding campaign as Chicf of the General Staff. He joined the army in Xoldavia a t the end of Febrnary, and applied himself diligently to the re-orgmisation of all departments of the serricc. The cavalry --as remounted, and the front ranks of the Hussar regiments armed with lances as a better protcction against the swords of the Spliis ; the Cossacks mere increased to 22 polks, or regiments, of about 250 each ; the Commissariat was prorided with 2,000 Asiatic camels, a mode of transport well suited to the plains of B u l p r i s 
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screral changes m r c made in the commands. Count Pahlell con,-manded the 2nd corps, General Gassowski the 3rd, General Both the Gth, and General Rudiger the 7th. Altogether the army amounted to 48,000 infantry, 16,000 camlry, and 4,000 artillerr with 300 guns.
This force was not largcr than that with which the prcrious campaign had opened, but it vas stronger in artillery and light cavalry.
But before the army began its advance operations had already conimcnced by sea. The possession of n secure harbour south of the Balkan was of the utmost importance bcfore attcmpting the passage of that range. It would save the difficnlt and laborious task of trans.
porting military stores across the mountain passes, and would facilitate the provisioning of the b y .
Bourgas mould.have bcen the most suitable spot but for its proximity to Aidos, wliere the Turks had assembled a large force. Sizcboli n -a~ therefore selected, and so early as the middle of February it was OCCUpied by a Russian squadron without serious resistance. It had the advantages of ~1 strong position and a safe harbour, but was at a greater distance from the Russian line of opention than Bourgas.
Thc Seraskier was ordered to advance a t once from didos and rotake the place, but he delayed obeying tho order for several weeks, and when a t last he arrired before Sizeboli he found the Russians too firmly established to be dislodged. The ndrance of the Army did not commence till 3hy. The n-eather and the floods mem assigned as the cause of this delay, but in truth the preparations vere not completed earlier.
Part of the 2nd and 3rd corps now crossed the Danube at Hirsova snd joined the Gth aiid 7th corps, which had wintered around Varna. The other divisions of tlie 2nd and 3rd corps w x e detained in Wallachia, avaiting the construction of a bridge at Iialarasch a little below Silistria.
Diebitsch was forced to open the campaign with a siege, xhich ought not to &ye been left for the second Fear of the war. The capture of Silistria vas an absolute necessity before the Army could advance. Its garrison mas large, and it commanded every possible line of operation. Diebitsch arrived before it on the 17th Jlay, and found it exactly in the condition in which it vas left in the precedingautumn. The besieging army amounted to 15,000 men (shortly increased to 21,000) and 88 guns. The garrison, with the armed inhabitants, numbered some 20,000. Diebitsch proceeded with great caution. He would not even assault when there was apmcticable breach. He had l e a~~t to respect the Turk bchind a stone waU, and preferred the surer thou& slower process of mining.
After a brave defence of fortx-four days the place surrendered, and the garrison became prisoners of war.
YOL. xx.
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Diebitsch had, before the conclusion of the siegc, handed over thc command to General Krassowski, and had joined the main Army at Shnmh. Important events had already' taken place in that quarter, and this time the Turks had taken the initiative. The now Grand Vizier, after re-organizing thc motley force he had found a t Shumla, hait qiiitted his entrenchments-on the 16th of Nay and advanced in the direction of Pravadi with some 20,000 men, hoping to over!vhelm the force nuder General Roth. The 6th and 7th corps were v e q meal; from the losses of the prcccding campiign, and the sickliness of their minter quartcrs around Varna. They did not muster more thall 14,000 cffectivcs of all arms.
On tlic 17th the Vizier reached the village of Eski Arnautlar, where a force of Russians-3,OOO strong-had tnkcn up a well chosen position covered by five small redoubts. These the Vizicr instantly attacked with his left wing, \rhile with liis right wing heassaulted the entrenched works of Pravadi. Both tliese attacks werc repulsed after fifteen hours of hard fighting, and Russian reinforcements coming up during the night, the Vizier fell back upon Shumla. Such vigorous action was a great contrast to the supineness of the late Grand Vizier. Rcschid Pacha had set liis troops an example of pcrsonal bravery, and both be and his second in command had been rvoundcd. On the 28th Nay the Vizier again quitted Shumla at the head of 40,000 men, leasing only four regiments to guard the entrenched camp.
It was thc intelligence of this move which had decided Dicbitsch to leare Silistria. It was his intention to march with as many men as could be spared from tlic besieging force upon Praradi, to form a junction with the 6th and 7th corps, and then to tlirom liimself acrms the road fromPixvadi to Shumla, so as to intercept the Pasha's retreat and force him to fight in the open field. Should he succeed in doing so, he felt confident that discipline would prevail over numbers. This bold dccision decided the fate of the campaign and of thc war. The force with which it was undertaken numbered 21,000 infantry, 7,000 c a m l r~, and 146 guns.
Time will not allow me to relate the movements of the tn-o armies which preceded tlic decisive battle. The Vizier seems to have remained i n total ignorancc of Diebitsch's plans, and mas retracing liis steps leisurely toisards Shumla expecting to have to deal ouly with Gcneral Roth's weak force. But on tlic forenoon of the 11th June, 28,000 Russians barred his further passage. The battle so much dcsired by Diehitsch took place at Knlcrvtcha. The Turks rcsolutclg attempted to cut their x a y through, and for some hours their cfforts ~w r e successful. The Russians lost great. iiumbcrs of men and several guns ; but when at length they had succceded in driving the Turks back to their original position, which was a very strong one, a sudden panic seemed to come orer them. They broke their ranks and dieappeared singly in the thick woods. Scarccly a prisoner isas tzken, but the \diolc of the artillery and baggzgc fell into thc hands of the Russians. Tho Vizier with 600 liorsemen succeeded in reaching 
The former camp+ was lostby the inactivity of one Grand Vizier. The present was lost by the too enterprising spirit of another.
Diebitsch at length fonnd himself in a position to attempt the passage of the Balkan. Shumla, indeed; mas still in the hands of the enemy, but without an army, Shnmla was of little importance. A corps of observation mould suffice to keep its beaten and disheartened $prison in cheek. The fall of Silistria was hourly expected. Jvith the Dobmdscha, and the sea for a basis an advance would no longer be hazardous. The season was favonmble, for the great heats had not yet set in. The health of the Army made it desirable that it should quit its present unhealthy positions.
A11 these were arguments in favour of an immediate advance, but the Russian Army was too weak for such an undertaking. Diebitsch had b u t 25,000 men in all, and if he detached 10,000 to mask the entrenched camp of Shumla, there xould remain but 15,000 available for active operations. It seems unaccountable that the experience of the last year's campaign should not have taught Russin, the insufficiency of her preparations. Four precious weeks were lost while amaiting the fall of Silistria and the arrival of the besicging force.
On It was left to rratch Shumla. General Roth TFith the 6th corps vas ordered to admnce along the coast roads leading from Varna to Bourgas, while General Rudigcr with the 7th corps was to cross the mountains by the road from Pnvadi to Aidos. General Pahlen with the 2nd corps mas to act as a reserve to both these columns. The head-quarters accompanied the reserve. AIeaniddc the Grand-Vizier, alarmed for the safety of Shumla, chose this very moment, when the Rnssian Army was i n full march for the Balkan, to ordcr a force of nine regiments of regular infmtry, and several thousand Albanians, which had been allotted for the defence of the passes, to join him in the entrenched a m p .
Consequently the two Russian colnmns, d i c h had advanced to the Kamstchik, effected tho passage of that river a t Kiuprikoi without any serious opposition. The head-quarters with the reserve followed closely, and on the tenth day after learing S h u d a , the ~~h o l c Russian Army vas assembled around Roumelikoi to the south of the Balkanrange, and in free communication with the fleet.
I n this short time it had accomplished a march of above a hundred miles through an unknown and di5cult mountainous country. The passage of the Balkan had, after all, becn effected by one single routc.
3~2
At length the force under General Krassowski arrived.
Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 11:11 30 December 2014 70s " A SKETCIf OF TEE RUSSO-TURBISII CAXPAIGNS &dos still lay before them on their line of march. It is a town of some 25,000 inhabitants lying at the foot of the Balkan, and, thong\, nnfortificd, was very capabh of defence. The Vizier, alarmcd Jvhen too late by the Russian advance, had hastily sent n force of from ten to twelrc thouiand men across the mountains to occupy this important post; but they made but a mak defence, and the 7th corps quickly drove them out of the t o m and took possrssion of it. The filthy state of the Turkish camp a t Aidos is said to hare sown the sccds of the diseases mhich from this time forth raged among the Russian troops.
Diebitsch's Army was by this time rcduced to less than 25,000 men of all arms ; but it had a securc basis a t Bourgas, and an ample supply of provisions. Intelligence had bcen receired from Adrianople that there mere only a few thousand men collected for the defence of the city, and that no serious resistance nccd be anticipated. Diebitseh, therefore, decided t.0 advance, knowing the effect that the possession of Adrianoplc would produce at the capital, aml sent on the 2nd corps as an advanced guard.
The rest of the army did not at once follow, for a report had reached the head-quartem that the Pacha of Rustchuk had effected a junction with the Vizier, and that the Russian line of communication was seriously threatened. This report induccd Dicbitsch to concentrate his forces, and to more along the foot of the Balkan to Slirno, about 70 miles west of Bourgas. Rnmonr had exaggerated the danger. He found only a small force a% that place, which he quickly dispersed, and he then resumed his advance upon Adrianoplc, from which he was no farther than he had been at Aidos. Fortified positions were abandoned on tho approach even of mvalry unsupported, and it --as clear that any measure however bold might be ventured upon with impunity against such D foe.
Indeed the only enemy the Russians had to encounter on the march was the intolenble heat, aggravated by scarcity of water, for the Turks had destroyed the fountains along the road. Ferer was increasing in the camp at a fearful rate, and it mms with difliculty that the crifecbled troops could accomplish a daily march of ten miles.
At Bnyuk-Derbend there is a formidable defile, but happily for the Russians it mas undefended.
At length, on the 19th August, four mceks after crossing the Balkan, 20,000 men, enfceblcd as we have seen by disease, encamped bcfore the gates of Adrianoplc. Out of a force of 70,000 men, with which the campaign had opened in May, this was all that could be brought together for a further advance of more than a hundred and thirty milcs upon the capital. It would scarcely be too much to say, looking at it from a military point of view, that the Russians were no nearer Constantinople at the end of the second campaign than they wcre at the beginning of the first.
Adrianople is an open t o m , and though its position is strong, it would have requircd a largo force to hold it. The garrison, composc~* mainly of fngitires from Aidos and Slivno, had no heart for fighting, and without waiting to be summoned they offered to capitulate. Diebitsch gladly accepted the offer with the conditions that they o\'crc to gire up their arms, their standards, and thcir guns. Tllese hard terms mere accepted without hesitation, and the Russians marched 'into Adrianople, to use Noltke's TrordS, "as into a frienay town, '( d i e r e nothing but the garrison is changed."
Still blarshal Diebitsch's position rras a critical one in spite of I& succcss ; and it caused so much ansiety at St. Petersburg, that a fresh levy of 90,000 men was ordered, lest the negotiations set on foot at Constantinople should fail. Rest, so far from restoring the health of the troops, seemed to aggrarato the disease that had so long hung about them. Colonel Chesncy, who was present a t a g n n d review licld a t Adrianoplo some months later, states that there mere less than 13,000 men of all arms on the ground.
But General Diebitscli put a bold face on the matter, and in order to strengthen the hands of tho Ambassador at Constantinoplc, he advanced in three columns towards the capital. Report, fortunately for him, had magnified his force to 60,000 men, and as there was not cren a show of opposition made to his ndrance, the weakness of his actual numbers escaped detection.
His baldness was re-n-arded, for the Porte, alarmed by the approach of the enemy, and still more perhaps by the fear of an outbreak in the capital, signed, on the 28th of August, the Treaty of Adrianople.
M y time mill not allow me to relate the events of the Campaign of 1829 on the Asiatic frontier. That campaign had no influence on the result of the war, nor was there anything remarkablc in tlic operations on either side. The Turks displayed indeed somewhat more vigour and enterprise than they liad done in Europe; not only did they take the initiative, but they did That is rery foreign to their habits :--they undertook a winter campaign in the hope of recovering the ground they had lost in summer. On the 18th February, they made a bold but unsuccessfnl attempt to re-take Akhaltsikh by escalade, and whcn this failed, they commenced a regular siege. But D Russian force soon camc to its relief and they u-cre defeated with h e a v loss.
The defection of thc Pasha of Nush a t this time deprircd the Turks of some 12,000 Kurdish cavalry-a ~c e g serious loss. In every quarter success attended the operations of the Russians. I n June, Paskevitdi forced his s a y across the Sagadugh range, and after defeating the Army with mhich the Seraskier attempted to cover Erzeroum, he pursued him to thc gates of that city and forced him to surrender. He then ndranced upon Trcbizonde, but finding the country almost inaccessible for artillerj-, and mccting with a more serious opposition tlian he had ospected from the warlike Xahomcdan tribes of that mountainous district, he abandoned the project and fell back upon
Erzcroum.
Some desultory fighting took place after this at Baiburt and a t Bayazid, but intelligence of the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople put an end to hostilities before any decisive blow -ins struck. The Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 11:11 30 December 2014 most serious result bf the war in Asis was the loss of Akhltsikh; &ich this Treaty handed over to Russia.
It will be unnecessary for me to make more than a very fern general observations on the conduct of this war. Those who wish for a critical ~~s z i m k of the operations of both armies will find it in the concluding chapter of Uoltkc's History. Such a war as that between Ihssia and Turkey cannot be judged by the ordinary rules of Europwn \Tarfare, Tho best recognised principles of strategy were systematically ignored both by Turks and Russians ; by the former from sheer incapacity or inertncss, by the latter from a more or less well-founded contempt of her enemy.
If me arc to judge of this mr simply by its results, it is certainly one of the most successful mars on record. It had the effect of greatly strengthening the influence of Russia in +he e3st of Europe, and of heightening her prestige in the Test. Bat it is another question whether it has in anything like an equal degree increased her reputation or given fresh proof of her strength, as a grcat military pomer.
The energy and determination of her oificers, and the courage and constancy of her soldiers, under difficultics and trials of no ordinary kind are indeed beyond all praise ; but a careful study of this Tar not only reveals an unaccountable want of foresight in her military administration, b u t lesds one to doubt whether the power of ltussia, at least for offensire warfare, has not been greatly orei-rated.
The most interesting question for us, cspecially at the. present moment, is whether the campaigns of '28 and '29 will throw light upon any future war that may be carried on between the same combatants, and on the same ground. One thing is clear : which is, tliat, should such a war unhappily arise, it mill take place under greatly altered conditions. I am looking at the question solely from D military poht of T-iew.
On the one hand, a Turkish army of the present day \.~ould be rery d%erent from what it .was now nearly fifty Fears ago. The Xizam would doubtless be mare efficient soldiers than they were then ; but, if I am not greatly mistaken, the irrcgdar troops, both horse and foot, xhich did such good service a t Varna and Shumla, would be found to hare lost much of that daring courage which made them prefer death to surrender. The Bashi-Bazouk of 1876 is but a. sorry representatire of the Spahi or Ainaout of '28 or '19. Kor is it to be expected that after so sewre a lesson, the frontier fortresses-still less the passes of the Balkan-mill again be neglected.
On the acther hand, the Russians are not Iikely ,z second time so greatly to miscdcnlatc the forccs required for a successful invasion of Turkcr. They cannot expect again to hare the undisputcd command of the Black Sea, which alone enabled Narshal Diebitsch to add the proud title of " Za Balkanski"-or crosser of the Balkan-to his name ; and in crossing the Pruth they mill feel that they are embarking upon an undertaking which will task to the utmost the strength of the Russian Empire to bring to n successful issue. Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 11:11 30 December 2014
